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HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE
MARCELLUS SHALE:
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE
AMENDMENTS TO NEW YORK’S MINERAL
RESOURCES LAW
PATRICK SILER†
INTRODUCTION
On New Year’s Day, 2009, in the small town of Dimock,
Pennsylvania, Norma Fiorentino’s water well exploded.1 Other
residents of the same community observed that their water was
discolored and that it would bubble, foam, or give off odors.2
Testing by the state Department of Environmental Protection
revealed that nearby drilling for natural gas had exposed the
aquifer to methane. The drinking water of at least nine homes
was contaminated. Four were at risk of exploding.3 In 2009, as
industrial drilling for natural gas began in earnest, more than a
dozen accounts of drinking water polluted by toxic contaminants
surfaced throughout Dimock.4
Dimock is one of hundreds of local jurisdictions in the
Northeast that has seen a dramatic increase in recent years of a
process of drilling for natural gas known as hydraulic fracturing,

†
J.D. Candidate, June 2012, St. John’s University School of Law; B.F.A., 2003,
University of North Carolina School of the Arts. Winner of the NYSBA
Environmental Law Section’s 2011 Prof. William R. Ginsberg Memorial Essay
Contest. Great thanks to Professors Mary L. Lyndon and Robert A. Ruescher for
their invaluable input and direction, and to the DEC’s Jennifer L. Maglienti, Esq.,
for her feedback.
1
Laura Legere, Nearly a Year After a Water Well Explosion, Dimock Twp.
Residents Thirst for Gas-Well Fix, TIMES-TRIB. (Scranton, Pa.) (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/nearly-a-year-after-a-water-well-explosion-dimocktwp-residents-thirst-for-gas-well-fix-1.365743.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. Pennsylvania has experienced six documented explosions caused by
migrating gas in the last decade, killing four people. Contamination has affected at
least 60 water wells, including three municipal water supplies. Id.
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or “fracking.”5 This “gas rush” is the result of a confluence of
recent events, including high energy prices, economic recession,
state budgetary shortfalls, and industry exemption from federal
regulation, to name a few.
Chiefly, it stems from the
advancement of fracturing technology to allow for increased gas
extraction from tightly-packed formations of shale.6 The gas
extraction industry has accelerated development of a formation
known as the Marcellus Shale Play, a large, subterranean
formation that stretches from the Southeastern corner of Ohio
through West Virginia, Northwestern Pennsylvania, and into the
Catskill Mountain region of New York State.7
As the development by natural gas extractors of the nearby
West Virginia and Pennsylvania Marcellus increased, a debate
began about the practical implications of hydraulic fracturing in
New York State. Proponents of the practice point to studies
concluding that hydraulic fracturing does not pose a significant
threat to drinking water supplies.8 They emphasize the potential
benefits of the practice, noting that natural gas development
could provide a desperately needed economic boost to a
chronically depressed region within a state suffering from
historic budget shortfalls.9 It could also bring a cheap, clean
source of energy to the nearby power-hungry metropolitan areas
of New York and Philadelphia.10
Opponents counter with
numerous anecdotal accounts of poisoned wells, flammable tapwater, and deteriorating health in communities across the

5
See Abrahm Lustgarten, New York’s Gas Rush Poses Environmental Threat,
PRO PUBLICA (July 18, 2008, 2:42 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/new-yorksgas-rush-poses-environmental-threat-722.
6
Id.
7
See generally J. DANIEL ARTHUR, ET AL., WATER RESOURCES AND USE FOR
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION (2011), available at
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/ENVreports/FE0000797_
WaterResourceIssues.pdf.
8
See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS ch. 4, at 19 (2004) [hereinafter
IMPACT
STUDY],
available
at
EPA
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic
fracturing/wells_coalbedmethanestudy.cfm.
9
See Mireya Navarro, Gas Drilling is Severely Restricted in Catskill Watershed
Supplying New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A15.
10
See Navarro, supra note 9.
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country where the common factor is a local increase in fracking.11
They note particularly that the Marcellus Shale formation lies
deep underneath the Catskill watershed, which supplies drinking
water to over 9 million people in the Greater New York City
area.12 Due to the high quality of that watershed, the City is able
to provide unfiltered water directly from upstate, saving the
billions of dollars it would otherwise be forced to spend on
filtration.13 Contamination of the Catskill watershed, fracking
opponents argue, would be catastrophic.14
Faced with the conflict between pressure to develop one of
the world’s largest natural gas fields and equal pressure to
protect one of its most vital sources of drinking water, the New
York State Senate chose to err on the side of caution. In August
of 2010 the State Senate passed a bill suspending the issuance of
new permits for hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale
formation in order to “continue the review and analysis of the
effects of hydraulic fracturing on water and air quality,
environmental safety and public health.”15 The Governor vetoed
the legislation, but enacted a narrower moratorium by Executive
Order.16 The Order prohibited the issuance of permits for “highvolume, horizontal hydraulic fracturing” until July 1, 2011.17
The ban has since remained in place pending the further revision
of State regulations.18
Barring further action by the legislature or the Governor’s
office, fracking in the New York Marcellus will soon be a reality.
Should the ban on the practice be lifted, it will be regulated
11
See Clifford Krauss & Tom Zeller, Jr., When a Rig Moves in Next Door, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at BU1.
12
See Navarro, supra note 9.
13
Id.
14
See Sandy Long, America’s Most Endangered River: the Upper Delaware,
RIVER REPORTER (June 3, 2010), http://www.riverreporter.com/issues/10-0603/head1-endangered.html.
15
N.Y.S. 8129B, 233d Sess. (2010).
16
Tom Zeller, Jr., New York Governor Vetoes Fracking Bill, N.Y. TIMES GREEN
BLOG (Dec. 11, 2010, 7:35 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/new-yorkgovernor-vetoes-fracking-bill.
17
Id.
18
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s office described reports that it would seek to
reinstate the practice of fracking in July 2011 as “baseless speculation and
premature.” Edith Honan & Joan Gralla, New York Seeks To Lift Fracking
Moratorium, REUTERS (June 30, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/06/30/natgas-newyork-fracking-idUSN1E75T16420110630. For more on the
revision of New York’s regulations, see infra, Part I.C.1.
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under New York State law.19 This Note explores the regulatory
framework currently in place in the state and tests it against
several issues of practical application evident from the
experiences of other states that have dealt with the matter.20
The statute governing regulation of the hydraulic fracturing
process in New York State contains a number of internal
contradictions. The statute states its policy goals as follows:
first, to regulate the development of oil and gas “in such a
manner as will prevent waste”; second, to develop properties “in
such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas
may be had”; and third, to protect fully “the correlative rights of
all owners and the rights of all persons including landowners and
the general public.”21 The policy objectives listed illustrate the
overarching contradiction contained in the statute: The state
may choose to prevent waste and thereby achieve a greater
recovery of oil and gas, or it may choose to protect fully the rights
of all persons. It cannot do both at once. The conflicts between
the statute’s stated policies are illustrated by examining three
main subjects.
First, limiting the statutory definition of “waste” to only the
physical waste of oil and gas fails to account for the overall
impact and resource expenditure of excess drilling. Second, the
New York statute does not sufficiently address likely conflicts of
interest between lease-holders and property owners, both of
whom hold correlative rights in produced gas. Specifically, the
statute is inconsistent on two issues: first, the inevitable question
of whether fracking constitutes a trespass on—or rather under—
another’s land; and second, the tension between the rights of
landowners and the State’s policy of compulsory integration of

19

See infra, Part I.B.
This Note does not seek to advocate for or against the utilization of this
method by the fossil fuel extraction industry in New York State, nor to question the
wisdom of the exemption of the fracking process from federal regulation. These
subjects have been, and will no doubt continue to be, discussed at length by other
commentators. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need To Revisit Regulation, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2009); Laura C. Reeder, Note, Creating a Legal
Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale
Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 999 (2010); Aaron Stultz
Heishman, Recent Development, Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 23
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 561 (2010).
21
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011).
20
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property to facilitate a greater recovery of gas. Lastly, the
statute fails to delineate clearly the rights of the municipalities
that most directly represent the local public.
In the interest of maximizing the efficacy of the law’s stated
policy objectives—a greater recovery of gas, protection of the
correlative rights of property owners, and the full protection of
the rights of all persons, including producers and the general
public22—and minimizing the need for court action in addressing
potential conflicts, this Note concludes by recommending the
following discrete amendments to the current regulatory
framework.
First, the legislature should adopt a more
comprehensive definition of waste that includes environmental
waste and disposal. Second, legislators must reconcile the
conflict between landowners’ rights and the practice of
compulsory integration in one of two ways: either by recognizing
that the rights of landowners are subservient to the state’s
interest in facilitating the recovery of gas, or by preserving the
right of landowners to keep their land free from industrial
drilling and ending the practice of compulsory integration.
Third, legislators should define the rights of operators on land
compulsorily integrated under the present system. Finally,
recognizing that the municipality is the political entity most
receptive to the will of the public at the local community level,
the power of local governments to determine what procedures
may be imposed on industry to safeguard their local resources
must be made clear. The state legislature should define the term
“regulation” in Article 23’s supersession clause to specify how
much control local governments may exercise over the location of
drilling and the traffic to drilling sites.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Fracking: The Process

Hydraulic fracturing allows for effective extraction in areas
where conventional drilling would otherwise be inefficient and
uneconomical. Conventional drilling is achieved by the boring of
a shaft into the ground until it taps a pool of oil or gas.

22

Id.
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Extraction continues until that pool is exhausted.23 But because
of the extremely low natural permeability of shale, in a formation
like the Marcellus, vast reserves of natural gas are effectively
captured, bound up in the many stratified layers of rock, and
unable to collect in large, unitary pools.24 A conventional well,
therefore, can extract only a very limited amount of gas from the
area beneath it. Given the high cost of drilling, the extraction
industry has understandably refrained from embarking on
conventional drilling ventures likely to return only a meager
yield.25
The fracking process, on the other hand, provides a
technological means of extracting gas from shale more efficiently.
The process begins in much the same way as conventional
drilling: the extractor bores a hole into the ground, but at a
somewhat horizontal slope, cutting across a wide area of the
shale formation rather than straight down into it. Wells can
extend laterally as far as 5,000 feet.26 The extractor then injects
water treated with a mixture of chemicals and solid particles—
called propping agents or “proppants”27—into the well with highpressure pumps. The pressure causes the rock to crack, allowing
deeper penetration by the treated water and breaking the shale
into small pieces.28 The chemical compounds with which the

23
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-TR-0565,
DRILLING SIDEWAYS—A REVIEW OF HORIZONTAL WELL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS
DOMESTIC APPLICATION 1–2 (1993), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/petroleum/
tr0565.pdf.
24
See, e.g., Marcellus Shale: The Enviormental Review Process for Natural Gas
Exploration in the Marcellus Shale, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION
[hereinafter Marcellus Shale], http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
25
The total costs of extraction, from exploration through to production,
transport, storage, and distribution, are incredibly high and have increased over the
last several decades. The nominal cost per natural gas well drilled in 2008 is nearly
50 times what it was in 1960. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
DOE/EIA-0383(2009), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 112 fig.4.8 (2010), available at
http://wilcoxen.maxwell.insightworks.com/pages/3427/oil-mdc-data.pdf.
26
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., PRELIMINARY REVISED DRAFT:
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS,
AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM ch. 5, at 24–25 (2011) [hereinafter
PRDSGEIS], available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ogprdsgeisfull.pdf.
27
Marcellus Shale, supra note 24. Common proppants include sand, resincoated sand, aluminum pellets, and man-made ceramics. A proppant is typically
selected because its permeability is greater than the rock in the surrounding
formation.
28
Id.
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water has been treated allow the proppant to congeal, forming
fissures in the rock around the well. These fissures cause the
natural gas that would otherwise remain trapped in the shale to
flow into the well where it can be extracted, stored, and
ultimately transported for use in the energy market.29
Although recovery of natural gas by hydraulic fracturing has
been highly lauded by many industrialists and politicians as a
cleaner energy alternative to coal and oil, as well as a key
component of American energy independence,30 several
environmental concerns cloud fracking’s “green energy” pedigree.
Chief among these concerns is the fact that the fracking process
requires the use of massive amounts of water. Drilling a well can
require as many as 600,000 gallons of water, and each frack of an
individual well requires between 50,000 and 350,000 gallons of
water.31 This water can be transported via pipeline, but is more
often trucked to extraction sites. Transporting this quantity of
water requires the use of hundreds of tanker trucks for the
drilling and initial frack of a single well. Given that each well is
likely to be fracked up to eighteen times before it is closed and
abandoned, the amount of water consumed per well can exceed
five million gallons.32 This level of water usage, along with the
fuel expenditure and resultant emissions commensurate with the
trucking of that water, thus gives the hydraulic fracturing
process a significant environmental footprint.
29

Id.
The number of large shale plays in the United States, most notably the
Bakken, Barnett, Montney, and Haynesville formations, have made the United
States a world leader in natural gas production. See Natural Gas: An
Unconventional Glut, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2010, at 12. This abundance has led
some to call America “the Saudi Arabia of natural gas.” Joe McKendrick, America,
the Saudi Arabia of Natural Gas, SMARTPLANET (Mar. 18, 2010, 9:13 AM),
http://www.smartplanet.com/business/blog/business-brains/america-the-saudiarabia-of-natural-gas/5606.
31
See Chesapeake Energy, Hydraulic Fracturing Facts: Water Usage,
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, http://www.hydraulicfracturing.com/Water-Usage/Pages/
Information.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
32
Id. Using the ranges provided by industry, the variance between the potential
minimum and maximum amount of water usage is notable. Calculated using the
numbers at the smaller end of the range, the minimum amount of water used over
the life of a well is 965,000 gallons. The numbers from the higher end of the range,
though, yield an estimated water usage of 6.9 million gallons of water for a single
well. In the information it supplies to the public on the subject, New York’s
Department of Environmental Conservation provides numbers decidedly nearer to
the bottom of this range. Marcellus Shale, supra note 24 (“Each well may use more
than one million gallons of water.”).
30

WF_Siler (Do Not Delete)

358

12/3/2012 12:46 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:351

But the issue of the sheer amount of water—itself an
increasingly scarce resource—that the fracking process requires
is directly connected to a second key environmental concern: how
to handle that volume of water after it has been used. The
extraction industry describes water that has been treated for
hydraulic fracturing as produced water or “flowback.”33 Produced
water contains both proppants and a chemical “cocktail”: a blend
of chemical agents not typically disclosed to the public because
extractors regard individual chemical blends as trade secrets.34
Although the specific composition of many of these compounds is
unknown, commonly used components include benzene and
ethylene—known carcinogens.35
Fracking fluid is further
contaminated during the pumping process because it is exposed
to the methane gas that it is intended to help extract.36
Extractors can recover between 68 and 82 percent of the water
used in the drilling and fracturing processes, but the remainder
of this produced water remains in the ground.37 Produced water
thus creates two distinct environmental issues: first, the
potential impacts of the unrecoverable water on the surrounding
areas; and second, the question of how best to handle the water
that has been recovered.
The potential environmental and health impacts of
unrecovered fracking fluid in deep shale formations are largely
unknown. In 2004, the EPA conducted a study of the practice of
hydraulic fracturing in underground coal formations. The study
raised the possibilities of artificial fractures extending to an
underground source of drinking water (“USDW”) or facilitating
the movement of produced water through natural formations into
a USDW as “scenarios . . . of potential concern.”38 The EPA
33

See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 98.
Abrahm Lustgarten, Buried Secrets: Is Natural Gas Drilling Endangering
(Nov.
13,
2008,
2:00
PM),
U.S.
Water
Supplies?,
PROPUBLICA
http://www.propublica.org/article/buried-secrets-is-natural-gas-drilling-endangeringus-water-supplies-1113 (“ ‘It is like Coke protecting its syrup formula for many of
these service companies[.]’ ” (quoting Scott Rotruck, Vice President of Corporate
Development at Chesapeake Energy)).
35
On benzene, see U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Testing Status Benzene
10389-Y, NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=
BCB630F7-123F-7908-7BB1B8384496F5B8 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) ; on ethylene,
see id. at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/profiles/EthyleneOxide.pdf.
36
EPA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 15, 17.
37
Id. ch. 4, at 15–16.
38
Id. ch. 3, at 5–6.
34
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concluded, though, that “the injection of hydraulic fracturing
fluids into coalbed methane wells poses little or no threat to
USDWs” and that “[a]lthough potentially hazardous chemicals
may be introduced into USDWs when fracturing fluids are
injected into coal seams that lie within USDWs, the risk posed to
USDWs by introduction of these chemicals is reduced
significantly by groundwater production and injected fluid
recovery . . . .”39 Still, the EPA did not rule out the potential for
contamination of drinking water sources by fracking fluids.
Rather, the Agency’s study concluded only that among the
incidents of drinking water contamination, the study found no
“confirmed evidence that drinking water wells have been
contaminated by hydraulic fracturing fluid injection.”40
Recognizing the acute toxicity of at least one common additive to
fracking fluid—diesel fuel—the Agency “reached an agreement
with the major service companies to voluntarily eliminate diesel
fuel from hydraulic fracturing fluids that are injected directly
into USDWs for coalbed methane production.”41
The environmental and health impacts of produced water
that has been recovered, though also largely untested, are
potentially even more profound. Unlike the fracking fluid that
remains underground, often thousands of feet beneath potential
drinking water sources, produced water that is recovered must be
stored above ground until transportation to a long-term storage
or treatment facility can be arranged.42 One common method
used by the industry is the storage of produced water in open
containment pits or tanks, where it awaits trucks to carry it
away.43 Potential for spillage or leakage into the surrounding
environment is high any time the water is moved from one
location to another.44 Due to the interconnectedness of water
systems, spills or leaks of produced water can easily travel
significant distances and ultimately affect drinking water, as
well as animal and plant life, far from the drilling site.45
39

Id. ch. 7, at 5.
Id. ch. 7, at 6.
41
Id. ch. 7, at 5.
42
See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 98–99, 118, 120, 123, 130–31.
43
See Galen Sanford, ‘Produced’ Water an Economic Opportunity, GREENTECH
MEDIA (May 13, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/producedwater-an-economic-opportunity/.
44
See EPA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 16.
45
Id.
40
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In addition to water use and contamination concerns, gas
wells utilizing the fracking process pose potential problems to air
quality as well. During production, some gaseous hydrocarbons
change state and become a liquid, referred to as condensate.46
Tanks collecting condensate on drilling sites vent benzene,
toluene, xylene, and ethylbenzene into the air. Because the
vapors of these hydrocarbons are heavier than air, they can
accumulate in the surrounding areas.47 Prolonged exposure to
significant quantities of the vented hydrocarbons can lead to
serious health effects, including irreversible nerve damage.48
B.

General Regulatory Structure

The regulation of the recovery of natural gas by underground
injection of fluids is solely within the purview of the state where
the drilling operation is conducted. Before 2005, the process was
subject to federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
with the EPA providing states with minimum requirements for
underground injection control (“UIC”) programs.49
A state
retained primary regulatory authority of the activity unless the
EPA determined that its UIC program did not meet those
minimum requirements, which included inspection, monitoring,
and record-keeping standards as well as prohibitions against
state agencies authorizing any rule that endangered drinking
water sources.50 But in 2005, the Safe Drinking Water Act was
amended by Congress specifically to exempt from the definition
of underground injection the “underground injection of fluids or
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production
activities.”51 Since this amendment, regulation of fracking for oil
or gas production has been the exclusive domain of state
authorities.

46
See,
e.g.,
Sources
of Oil
and
Gas Pollution, EARTHWORKS,
http://www.earthworksaction.org/airpollutionsources.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
47
Id.
48
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 35.
49
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).
50
Id. at 1264; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a)-(b) (2006).
51
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1).
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Statutory Underpinnings
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Regulation of the natural gas drilling industry in New York
is governed by Article 23 of the Environmental Conservation
Law.
That statute commits to the state Department of
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) the authority to
promulgate
rules
overseeing
the
development
and
implementation of natural gas extraction, treatment, and
transportation.52 As discussed above, DEC regulations are meant
to provide for development according to several stated policy
objectives: first, to prevent waste; second, to provide for a greater
recovery of gas; third, to protect fully the correlative rights of all
owners; and finally, to protect fully the rights of all persons
including landowners and the general public.53
The DEC’s regulations, in turn, are subject to certain
requirements contained in New York’s State Environmental
Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”).54 SEQRA requires that state
agencies consider the environmental impact of any activity
subject to discretionary approval before issuing a permit.55 Thus,
when an action is deemed to have a potentially significant
impact, the DEC is required to draft an Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”). Once a draft EIS is available, it must be
posted for a comment period of at least thirty days, allowing the
public to voice any potential concerns to agency decision makers
and project sponsors.56
Rather than consider each activity’s environmental impact
on a case by case basis, the DEC has standardized its
assessments through two mechanisms: the Environmental
Assessment Form (“EAF”) and the Generic Environmental
Impact Statement (“GEIS”). The EAF allows permit applicants
to provide the DEC with the details of a specific proposed
activity’s estimated environmental impact rather than requiring
agency analysis of every proposal.57 A GEIS allows the DEC to
52

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305(8) (McKinney 2011).
Id. § 23-0301.
54
See id. §§ 3-0301(1)(b), (2)(m), 8-0113.
55
See N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 617.7 (2011).
56
See id.
57
See ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0109(2); Defreestville Area Neighborhoods Ass’n v.
Town Bd., 299 A.D.2d 631, 632–34, 750 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166–67 (3d Dep’t 2002); see
also N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 617.9 (2011); SEQR: Environmental Impact
53
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complete one EIS for an entire class of activities, rather than
demanding a separate EIS for each individual proposal within
the class.58 Public comment period is solicited once, prior to the
adoption of the GEIS, rather than prior to the issuance of each
individual permit.59 Once released, the GEIS covers virtually all
projects within the class.
Until recently, proposed gas wells in New York were covered
by a GEIS promulgated in 1992. The 1992 GEIS determined that
the issuance of a standard individual oil or gas well drilling
permit anywhere in the state, when no other permits are
involved, was a “non-significant action” under SEQRA.60 In 2008,
anticipating increased instances of horizontal drilling and highvolume hydraulic fracturing in the State, the DEC determined
that these practices warranted further review.61 The DEC
resolved to develop a Supplemental GEIS (“SGEIS”) to address
three key factors distinguishing these practices from more
conventional drilling: “(1) required water volumes in excess of
GEIS descriptions, (2) possible drilling in the New York City
Watershed, in or near the Catskill Park, and near the federally
designated Upper Delaware Scenic and Recreational River, and
(3) longer duration of disturbance at multi-well drilling sites.”62
A draft SGEIS was published in September of 2009.63 In
response to additional research and extensive public comment on
the draft, the DEC continued to revise the SGEIS through the
summer of 2011.
A Preliminary Revised Draft SGEIS
(“prdSGEIS”) was released in July of 2011,64 with a further
revision released in September.65 As of this writing, the DEC has
Assessment in New York State, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/357.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
58
N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 617.10.
59
Id.
60
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING
REGULATORY
PROGRAM
§ II.A,
tbl.1(a)
(July
1992),
available
at
ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/geismaster.pdf.
61
PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 1, at 4–5.
62
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION
MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM ch. 1, at 4 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 DSGEIS],
available at ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/OGdSGEISFull.pdf.
63
See generally id.
64
See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26.
65
The Revised Draft SGEIS was issued on September 7, 2011, and was open for
public comment until January 11, 2012. See Marcellus Shale, N.Y. St. Department
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not yet released a finalized version of the SGEIS. For purposes
of its analysis, this Note assumes that the prdSGEIS will be
adopted without substantial alteration and that its terms will
govern the issuance of permits for new hydraulic fracturing wells
in the post-moratorium period.66 This Note does not pretend to
possess the scientific expertise necessary to present an opinion
on the sufficiency or efficacy of these measures.
2.

The Regulatory Life-Cycle of a Natural Gas Well67

a.

Birth: Permitting and Unitization

The process of complying with New York State regulations to
begin drilling for natural gas is relatively straightforward. As a
threshold matter, an operator must first demonstrate that it is a
legitimate organization with adequate financial security,68 but
broadly speaking, the process consists of just two steps. First,

of Envtl. Conservation, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2012).
66
The draft SGEIS for high-volume hydraulic fracturing exempts a proposed
fracking well from site-specific SEQRA determinations—and therefore from periods
of comment by the local public—unless it falls within one of seven particular
categories. Projects only require individual assessment where: (1) the target is
shallower than 2,000 feet; (2) the target is less than 1,000 feet below the base of a
known fresh water supply; (3) the proposal contains a centralized flowback water
surface impoundment not previously approved; (4) the well pad is within 300 feet of
a reservoir, stem, or controlled lake; (5) the well pad is within 150 feet of a private
water well or other watercourse; (6) the project anticipates a significant reduction in
the flow or habitat of nearby surface waters; or (7) the location is within 1,000 feet of
subsurface water supply infrastructure. See 2009 DSGEIS, supra note 62, ch. 8, at 2–
3. Whether this limitation on allowing the public to comment on individual wells
further compromises Article 23’s stated aim of fully protecting the rights of the
public is too broad-reaching a question for this Note.
67
The term “life-cycle” is used only as an analogy to present the reader with
familiar stages of existence: birth, maturity, and death. In many ways, the term is
inappropriate because gas wells do not share the characteristics of living things.
They are not alive, nor are they part of any natural cycle.
68
Well Permitting Process: Well Permitting Requirements To Drill, Deepen, Plug
Back and Convert for Oil, Gas, Solution Salt Mining and Other Regulated Wells,
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/
1772.html (last visted Apr. 16, 2012). An operator may demonstrate financial
security by submitting a Bond form, letter of credit, or similar financial document.
STATE
DEP’T
OF
ENVTL.
CONSERVATION,
Financial
Security,
N.Y.
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1622.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Assuming that
they maintain sufficient financial security, companies already on file with the DEC
need not repeat this step with each and every application.
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the operator must establish a “spacing unit” for the project. Once
the project is unitized, the operator may then apply to the DEC
for a well permit.69
The DEC defines a spacing unit as “the geographic area
assigned to the well for the purposes of sharing costs and
production.”70 The prdSGEIS provides three options for standard
unitization of hydraulic fracturing wells, but anticipates that
“multi-well pads”—spacing units that allow for the drilling of
multiple horizontal wells—will be the most commonly utilized.71
The prdSGEIS also allows for the drilling of additional wells from
separate locations within a spacing unit “with justification.”72
These are known as “infill” wells.73 The initial wellbore must be
approximately centered in the spacing unit, and no wellbore
inside the unit may be within 330 feet of a unit boundary.74
Because the standards for spacing units were the subject of
public comment in the generic EIS, no public comment period is
necessary for the DEC to establish a new unit that conforms with
those standards.
As an alternative to the standard spacing requirements, the
prdSGEIS allows for variances and non-conforming spacing units
when such an allowance satisfies the policy objectives of Section
23-0301—that is, preventing waste and achieving a greater
recovery of gas.75 In the event that the DEC wishes to grant a
permit to a non-conforming spacing unit, it must open the
proposal for a period of public comment and, potentially, an
adjudicatory hearing.76

69
Drilling Permit Application, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1783.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
70
PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 17 n.16.
71
Id. ch. 5, at 30.
72
Id. ch. 5, at 24.
73
Id. glossary, at 10. The drilling of infill wells is justified if “necessary to
satisfy the policy objectives of section 23-0301.” N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 230503(4) (McKinney 2011). The term “infill drilling” is understood in the industry to
refer to the “[a]dd[ition of] new wells in an existing field . . . to accelerate recovery or
to test recovery methods.” See, e.g., Infill Drilling Definition, OILGASGLOSSARY.COM,
http://oilgasglossary.com/infill-drilling.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Presumably,
then, a demonstration by the operator that an additional well would either
accelerate recovery or achieve a greater recovery of gas is sufficient to justify
additional drilling. See ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0301.
74
ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0501(1)(b)(1)(vi).
75
Id. § 23-0503(3)(a); PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 17.
76
PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 24.
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For a proposed spacing unit to be valid, the operator must
control at least 60 percent of the acreage contained within it.77
The remaining 40 percent—up to 256 acres—need not be
controlled at the time of application. This uncontrolled portion of
the proposed unit may be brought under the operator’s control
through the processes of voluntary or compulsory integration.78
Once a proposed spacing unit has been established, the
operator may proceed with the application process.
The
application itself is just two pages long, requiring only the
essential details concerning the proposed well, including its
location, type, and target formation.79
Along with the
application, the operator must submit a fee,80 as well as several
supporting documents. First, the operator must submit a survey
map showing the proposed well’s location, the boundaries of the
lease containing the well, and information on any wells nearby.
The operator must also present a map showing the proposed
spacing unit and an affirmation that it controls drilling rights in
60 percent of that unit. Finally, the operator must submit a
document describing the proposed drilling program and a form
assessing its likely environmental impact on the area.81 All of
these documents are prepared by the applicant and, though the
DEC inspects the service location to determine whether it is an
appropriate site for drilling, the DEC itself conducts no site-

77

ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0501(2).
Id. § 23-0501(2)(b). The process of integration is discussed at length infra,
Part II.B(2).
79
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, APPLICATION FOR PERMIT TO
DRILL, DEEPEN, PLUG BACK OR CONVERT A WELL SUBJECT TO THE OIL, GAS AND
SOLUTION MINING LAW, available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_
minerals_pdf/dril_req.pdf.
80
Drilling Permit Application, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1783.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). The amount of
the fee due is dependent on the depth of the proposed well.
81
Id.
78
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specific testing prior to issuance of a permit.82 In the case of
multi-well pads, the DEC may elect not to re-inspect the site
prior to issuing a permit to drill a new well.83
b.

Adolescence and Maturity: Site Preparation and Operation

Actual operation of a well is subject to more complex
regulation
including
record-keeping
and
monitoring
requirements, inspection, and testing for environmental
compliance.
Under the prdSGEIS, any permit issued for
hydraulic fracturing will be dependent on the operator meeting
an elaborate set of conditions.84 At the outset, an operator must
create a series of environmental impact plans, an emergency
response plan, develop a road use agreement with the
municipality, and properly prepare the site for industrial
activity.85 A number of conditions require periodic compliance
over the well’s lifetime. For example, prior to any initial site
disturbance or subsequent drilling, an operator must conduct
tests of residential water wells within 1,000 feet of the well pad.
These tests must be conducted by a certified commercial
laboratory, not by the DEC, and must continue periodically until
a year after the last fracking on the well pad occurs.86
The prdSGEIS contains extensive regulations covering site
maintenance, drilling, and stimulation—the process of actually
fracking the well.87 Some of these regulations concern what
materials are allowable to conduct a given activity. For example,
handling and containment of produced water on the well pad
requires steel tanks,88 and only properly labeled biocides—
additives used to kill bacteria—may be used for any operation.89
Other regulations prescribe specific procedural mandates for
82
See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 8, at 47–48. Discretionary activities require
an environmental impact assessment in accordance with the State Environmental
Quality Review (“SEQR”) and 6 NYCRR Pt. 617, but these assessments are now
standardized through the required—and operator-prepared—Environmental
Assessment Form. See SEQR: Environmental Impact Assessment in New York State,
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/
357.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
83
See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 8, at 47–48.
84
See id. app. 10 at 1–13.
85
Id. app. 10 at 1–3.
86
Id. app. 10 at 2; id. ch. 7, at 46.
87
See id. app. 10 at 3–11.
88
Id. app. 10 at 10.
89
Id. app. 10 at 6; see also id. glossary, at 1–2.

WF_Siler (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/3/2012 12:46 PM

HYDRAULIC FRACTURING

367

drilling and fracturing operations.
Required procedural
conditions must be followed for the monitoring of the unused
depth of fluid storage pits—known as “freeboard” monitoring90—
as well as the removal of fluids from those pits.91 Additional
conditions mandate “[a]ppropriate pressure control procedures”
during drilling92 and detailed procedures for the actual fracturing
of a well.93 The operational regulations extend to record-keeping
and reporting requirements. Records must be kept of the site’s
storm-water pollution protection plan (“SWPPP”),94 the adequacy
of the well’s cement bond,95 all pressure tests conducted,96 all
formations penetrated,97 and any fresh water, brine, oil, or gas
encountered during drilling.98 Furthermore, the operator must
maintain a detailed record of the hydraulic fracturing operation
and that log must be available for inspection by the DEC upon
request.99 This record must include “all types and volumes of
materials, including additives, pumped into the well, flowback
rates, and the daily and total volumes of fluid recovered during
the first 30 days of flow from well.”100 Operators are required to
report to the DEC before commencing surface casing cementing
operations,101 before using any previously unreviewed chemical
products,102 and upon the occurrence of “[a]ny non-routine
incident.”103
c.

Death: Plugging and Abandonment

Nor is terminating the operation of a well free from
regulation.
An operator may not abandon a well, even
temporarily, without notification to the DEC and compliance
with agency regulations.104 When an operator wishes to plug and
90

Id. app. 10 at 3; see also id. glossary, at 8.
Id. app. 10 at 3.
92
Id. app. 10 at 4.
93
Id. app. 10 at 9–10.
94
Id. app. 10 at 3.
95
Id. app. 10 at 7–8.
96
Id. app. 10 at 8.
97
Id. app. 10 at 12.
98
Id. app. 10 at 8.
99
Id. app. 10 at 10.
100
Id.
101
Id. app. 10 at 7.
102
Id. app. 10 at 8.
103
Id. app. 10 at 12.
104
See N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 555.3(a) (2011) (prohibiting
temporary abandonment for a period longer than 90 days).
91
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abandon a well permanently, it must provide the DEC with
formal notice of its intention to abandon at least ten days in
advance of commencing the procedure. The DEC then issues a
permit and arranges for a representative from the DEC to be
present to witness the plugging.105 Before the drilling site may
be abandoned legally, the operator must satisfy the DEC that the
well has been plugged in accordance with DEC regulations,
including that the well bore itself has been filled with cement
“from total depth to at least 15 feet above the top of the
shallowest formation from which the production of oil or gas has
ever been obtained in the vicinity.”106
Apart from closure of the well itself, the surrounding area
must also be reclaimed according to DEC regulations. The
prdSGEIS specifies that the removal of fluids from the site must
take place within forty-five days of the completion of
operations.107 The operator must consult with the DEC before
disposing of any cuttings containing chemical additives.108
Finally, the prdSGEIS requires that the operator scarify the
affected land to alleviate compaction before restoring, seeding,
and mulching the topsoil.109
The permit conditions and operational regulations listed
above are non-exhaustive, but provide some idea of the scope and
focus of the DEC’s regulatory structure and its emphasis on postpermitting regulation, supervision, and reclamation.
II. INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS & POLICY CONFLICTS
Some of the contradictions inherent in New York’s natural
gas mining statute are plain from a hard look at the statute
itself.
Further contradictions become apparent when the
regulatory framework is examined in the context of cases that
have arisen in other states with practical experience in
regulating high-volume hydraulic fracturing. This Section will
examine each of the statute’s stated policy aims, present several
of the more illuminating cases, and enumerate the specific
internal contradictions that they reveal in New York’s approach.

105
106
107
108
109

Id. § 555.4(b).
Id. § 555.5(a)(1).
See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, app. 10 at 11.
Id.
Id. app. 10 at 12.
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Prevention of “Waste”

The first stated policy objective of Article 23 of the
Environmental Conservation Law is to regulate the production of
gas “in such a manner as will prevent waste.”110 Article 23
includes an explicit definition of “waste” that does not seem to
extend to waste products or environmental waste. Specifically,
the Article’s definition is limited to “[p]hysical waste, as that
term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry,” and
waste which, through inefficiency, results in the loss of oil and
gas that would otherwise be recoverable.111 Industry glossaries
do not offer an indication of what might be meant by “physical
waste,”112 but the remaining context of the Article strongly
suggests that the definition is meant to be limited to either the
actual, physical loss of oil and gas or the diminishment of
potential recovery. Article 23’s enforcement provision lists as its
chief offense, quite succinctly, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person to: 1. Waste oil or gas.”113 Title 21 of Article 23, New
York’s codification of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and
Gas, reinforces this understanding of the term. It states that
“[t]he purpose of this compact is to conserve oil and gas by the
prevention of physical waste thereof from any cause.”114

110

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011).
Id. § 23-0101 (“Waste means a. Physical waste, as that term is generally
understood in the oil and gas industry; b. The inefficient, excessive or improper use
of, or the unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy; c. The locating, spacing,
drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas well or wells in a
manner which causes or tends to cause reduction in the quantity of oil or gas
ultimately recoverable from a pool under prudent and proper operations, or which
causes or tends to cause unnecessary or excessive surface loss or destruction of oil or
gas; d. The inefficient storing of oil or gas; and e. The flaring of gas produced from an
oil or condensate well after the department has found that the use of the gas, on
terms that are just and reasonable, is, or will be economically feasible within a
reasonable time.”); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 550.3(ax) (2011).
112
See Oil & Gas, ALPHADICTIONARY.COM, http://www.alphadictionary.com/
directory/Specialty_Dictionaries/Oil_,038_Gas (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); see also
Results for Waste Definition, OILGASGLOSSARY.COM, http://oilgasglossary.com/
?s=Waste (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
113
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1305(1) (McKinney 2011).
114
Id. § 23-2101(1).
111
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By contrast, the prdSGEIS developed by the DEC evidences
a broader, more conventional understanding of the term waste.115
It mandates disposal and treatment procedures for the cuttings
created during drilling, the liner of storage pits, the millions of
gallons of “flowback” or produced water, production brine, and
solid residual waste.116 The 2009 draft SGEIS referenced studies
by the Ground Water Protection Council (“GWPC”), an
association of regulators in other states, whose findings on
hydraulic fracturing waste disposal focus on produced water, not
the physical waste of oil or gas.117 As the study indicates,
“[a]pproximately 98% of all material generated from oil and gas
[exploration and production] operations in the U.S. is produced
water.”118
The generation of produced water creates a number of
environmental waste concerns. Most obviously, the recovery,
storage, and transport of produced water are highly susceptible
to spillage.119 Spillage not only necessitates soil remediation in
the area where the spill occurred, but also increases the risk of
contamination of nearby water resources.120 But even when no
spillage occurs, handling such large volumes of toxic material has
a significant environmental impact. Most particularly, there is
the question of the final disposal of the produced water. Some
produced water is re-injected into deep underground disposal
wells, where it can potentially affect sources of drinking water.121
Much of the produced water, though, is sent to treatment
115
Both definitions of “waste” should be distinguished from the term of art used
in property law to describe acts which cause “an irreparable injury to the
reversioner.” Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). Under
traditional waste doctrine, total extraction of a valuable resource from the land by
anyone but the landowner would always constitute waste. Because the
Environmental Conservation Law seeks to allow gas-drilling lessors to extract as
much of the resource as possible, the statute cannot mean to adopt this
understanding of the term. For a detailed look at the evolution of waste doctrine in
property law, see Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine:
A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006).
116
PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 129–34.
117
See 2009 DSGEIS, supra note 62, ch. 5, at 147 (citing GROUND WATER PROT.
COUNCIL, ET AL., STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO
PROTECT WATER RESOURCES (May 2009) [hereinafter GWPC REPORT], available at
http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%
20Regulations%20Designed%20to%20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf).
118
GWPC REPORT, supra note 117, at 30 (footnote omitted).
119
PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 6, at 18.
120
Id.
121
Id. ch. 5, at 131.
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facilities. The sheer volume of water to be moved demands that
hundreds of tanker trucks be employed to transport the waste
generated in a single fracturing.
Purely in terms of the
subsequent carbon dioxide emissions, this amount of traffic will
leave a substantial environmental footprint over time.
Unfortunately, potential problems do not stop after shipment.
The capacity of waste that any one treatment facility may
process is limited by the prdSGEIS, and a facility can be
punished for accepting waste that exceeds its capacity or that
contains chemicals it is not equipped to treat.122 Samples from
Pennsylvania and West Virginia raise an additional concern that
exposure to chemical additives and naturally-occurring elements
of underground rock formations may render produced water
untreatable by existing facilities.123
Confronted with such large quantities of waste, New York
facilities may either reach capacity or simply be unable to treat
produced water effectively. In such an eventuality, the disposal
options that remain open to operators are unclear. They may be
forced to ship their produced water out of state for treatment or
injection elsewhere. Since much of the water will have been
pumped out of fresh water sources within New York State,
removing it from the local hydrologic cycle could significantly
impact the State’s ecology.124 It is also possible that in the face of
disposal difficulties operators will be tempted to discharge
produced water directly into the environment in violation of DEC
regulations.
Whatever the ultimate outcome, given the
tremendous volume of produced water likely to be generated by
extensive fracking in the New York Marcellus, the legislature
should address the issue. To ignore the ramifications of both
solid and liquid waste products as a matter of policy by excluding
them from the statutory definition of waste is a gross error.
B.

Correlative Rights & Rights of Landowners

This Section will explore the related concepts of correlative
rights and the rights of landowners. It will begin by identifying
these rights as they are generally understood and the methods
122

Id. ch. 6, at 55, 59, 61.
Id. ch. 6, at 56.
124
See Robert B. Jackson et al., Water in a Changing World, ISSUES IN
ECOLOGY, Spring 2001, at 1, 3–9, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/
wacademy/acad2000/pdf/issue9.pdf.
123
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employed by the statute to protect them. Contrasting New
York’s approach with that of two other states, it will conclude
that an inherent tension exists between these two policy aims
and that the legislature should clarify for the courts which policy
interest it believes to be paramount.
1.

Correlative Rights

Correlative rights, the protection of which is Article 23’s
second stated policy aim, are not explicitly defined in that
Article. The correlative rights doctrine is generally defined as
one limiting the rights of landowners in a common underground
source to a reasonable share, typically based on the amount of
surface area owned by each.125 The term is perhaps most
commonly used to refer to the rights of landowners in a common
resource such as groundwater. Each owner must limit his use of
the resource to a proportional share, preventing one owner from
draining the resource and depriving his fellow owners of its
use.126
In the context of gas extraction, this means that each
landowner inside of a particular spacing unit is entitled to a
share of the gas extracted from the entire unit in proportion to
the amount of acreage owned, regardless of any single well’s
productivity. In theory, this practice protects the rights of an
owner to the resource that lies under her land without requiring
her to sink a new well and extract the gas herself.
2.

Rights of Landowners

Article 23 claims as its next policy objective the full
protection of “the rights of all persons including landowners.”127
The methods chosen to achieve this objective, detailed in Titles 7
and 9 of the Article, indicate that the rights referred to are,
primarily, a landowner’s correlative rights as discussed above.
Titles 7 and 9 provide, respectively, for the voluntary128 and
compulsory129 integration and unitization of oil and natural gas
pools and fields. The first step in creating a spacing unit takes

125
126
127
128
129

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (9th ed. 2009).
Id.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011).
Id. § 23-0701(1).
Id. § 23-0901(1).
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place at the time an operator applies for a permit to drill.130 For
the spacing unit to be approved, the operator/applicant need
control only 60 percent of the acreage contained within it.131
Once a spacing unit has been established, owners of the separate
interests within that unit may elect either to integrate interests
voluntarily or, if “necessary to carry out the policy
provisions . . . of this article,” by compulsion of the DEC.132 The
specific policy provisions to which this section of the statute
refers are not identified. One must assume, since compulsion by
its very nature indicates a limitation on a person’s right to
refuse, that 23-0901 does not refer to the provision that claims to
protect fully the rights of landowners.
The practice of
compulsory integration reveals an inherent contradiction in
Article 23. The statute at once claims to protect landowners’
rights, but denies landowners the right to refuse to integrate
their land into a spacing unit.
Once compelled to join a spacing unit subject to drilling, a
landowner’s rights are limited to the ability to choose between
three options. He may elect to become either an “[i]ntegrated
participating owner,” an “[i]ntegrated non-participating owner,”
or an “[i]ntegrated royalty owner.”133 If he elects to become a
participating owner, he is responsible to pay his proportionate
share of all costs associated with participation, including taxes
and claims of third parties related to the well.134 If he elects
instead to become a non-participating owner, he is still
responsible for his proportionate share of the costs, but that
share is reimbursed to the operator out of production proceeds
rather than owed to the operator prior to the commencement of
production.135 If he elects to become a royalty owner, he has no
obligation to share the costs of the well, but he is still entitled to
a royalty “equal to the lowest royalty . . . in the spacing unit, but
no less than one-eighth.”136
Thus, the landowner’s rights
protected by the statute are not the commonly understood rights
130

See supra Part I.C(2)(a).
ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0501(2).
132
Id. § 23-0901(2).
133
See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(1)–(3).
134
See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(2), (3)(c)(1)(ii)(A).
135
See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(1). A non-participating owner is also assessed a “risk
penalty” of two-hundred percent of his share of actual costs. Id.
136
See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(3). An integrated owner who makes no election is
deemed to be a royalty owner.
131
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of fee-simple ownership, but are rather limited to the rights of a
landowner to participate in a drilling operation and assert a
claim for a proportional royalty under the correlative rights
doctrine.
It is clear from the terms of the statute that a landowner
may not refuse to have her land integrated into a spacing unit.
Less clear is what rights the statute grants to an operator over
the land once that land has been integrated. The practice of
compulsory integration, in conjunction with the correlative rights
doctrine, focuses primarily on sub-surface rights. Still, the
statute does not prohibit—and may be read explicitly to allow—
surface disturbances of integrated land. Title 9 of Article 23
provides that “[t]he well operator, on behalf of the owner, shall be
entitled to conduct all acts associated with the well and
necessary facilities related thereto.”137 Elsewhere, the statute
describes the operations covered by an integration order as
“including, but not limited to, the commencement, drilling, or
operation of a well . . . upon any portion of a spacing unit.”138 As
such, though it may not occur regularly in practice, an operator
could theoretically drill on compulsorily integrated land against
the landowner’s will and still be in statutory compliance. Given
the potential money to be made by extracting natural resources,
theoretical loopholes in the regulatory structure can be expected
to turn into practical transgressions, as demonstrated by the
experiences of other states.
3.

The Fracking Pioneers: Correlative Rights & Landowners’
Rights in Texas and Oklahoma

Where correlative rights are granted to individual
landowners but large extraction companies dominate the market,
conflicts of interest are likely to arise. Demonstrative examples
of these conflicts are readily seen in two cases that arose in
Oklahoma and Texas, respectively.

137
138

Id. § 23-0901(3)(c)(1)(ii)(I).
Id. § 23-0901(3)(f).
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Correlative rights
Oklahoma’s high court has defined correlative rights as:
[T]hose rights which one owner possesses in a common source of
supply in relation to those rights possessed by other owners in
the same common source of supply . . . . [I]t must be emphasized
that [the] common source of supply in which the owners of
mineral interests possess correlative rights is the underlying
geological strata . . . rather than the well through which the oil
and gas is reduced to possession.139

Thus as a rule, to protect the common source of supply, the State
Commission set “allowables”—restrictions on the amount of gas
an individual well could produce despite its potential
productivity. Still, in the case of Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Corp.
Commission, the court recognized that exceptions to this rule
were often necessary, finding
the necessity of draining such reservoirs with a minimum of
waste[ ] as more important than attempting to guarantee to any
owner or operator that his permitted well or wells will produce
the precise quantity of gas which some may predict to be in
place under the entire surface area of his land.140

In Sinclair, owners whose wells exhibited lesser productivity
brought suit against the Commission for allowing owners of wells
with greater productivity to extract gas in excess of their
allowable share.141 The court recognized that the opposed
interests—prevention of waste and protection of correlative
interests—could not be reconciled without one giving ground to
the other. The court deemed it in the public’s best interest to
minimize waste rather than protect owners’ rights in the profits
of an inferior well.142
New York’s regulatory system handles this problem deftly, at
least as far as the interests of persons whose land is within a
spacing unit are concerned. Under New York law, owners share
the proceeds from all gas recovered on a given spacing unit
according to the percentage of land they own within that unit.
The productivity of an individual well, or its location on one
parcel rather than another, does not affect the amount to which
the owners of those parcels are entitled. Take, for example, a
139
140
141
142

Samson Res. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 702 P.2d 19, 22 (Okla. 1985).
378 P. 2d 847, 853 (Okla. 1963).
Id. at 850–51.
Id. at 852–53.
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spacing unit consisting of two parcels of land of equal size. A
well on parcel A turns out to be incredibly productive, but
another well on parcel B yields only modest recovery. Under a
system of allowables, operator A would be forced either to limit
the amount he extracted from the productive well, or apply for an
exemption. In New York, owners A and B share the profits of the
two wells equally. When adjacent parcels are not within the
same spacing unit, however, New York’s system is vulnerable to
other policy conflicts.
b.

Landowners’ Rights

It is unfortunate but likely that a policy of protecting
individual landowner’s rights regardless of environmental waste
will lead to disreputable, though not necessarily prohibited,
behavior on the part of extractors. In Texas, the recent case of
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust143 presented just
such a situation. In that case, the defendant extractor owned a
parcel of land directly adjoining another parcel on which it
merely held a lease.144
Drilling yielded an exceptionally
productive well on the leased parcel, recovering gas on which the
defendant was required to pay a royalty.
It was in the
defendant’s best interest as the owner of the adjacent parcel to
recover as much of the gas underneath the productive well from
the adjacent parcel as possible. Consequently, the defendant
drilled a number of infill wells on its own parcel as near to the
border with the productive parcel as allowed by law.145 The
defendant then extensively fracked the wells on its own parcel,
causing a significant amount of the gas from the productive
parcel to drain across the boundary to the adjacent wells.146
One salient issue raised by Coastal Oil was whether the
penetration by hydraulic fracturing of an adjoining parcel of land
constitutes a trespass allowing for recovery of damages in the
amount of the value of the gas drained.147 To resolve such an
issue, one must first determine which policy concern—the rights
of landowners or the prevention of waste—one wishes to prevail.

143

268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008).
Id. at 5.
145
Id. at 6.
146
Id. at 7 (“[T]he frac[k]ing of the Coastal Fee No. 1 and No. 2 wells
was . . . ‘massive’ . . . .”).
147
Id. at 4.
144
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The outcome then depends on whether one’s definition of waste is
limited to the physical waste of the gas itself or broadened to
include environmental waste. The facts of Coastal Oil present
another strong argument for the expansion of the definition of
waste to include environmental factors other than the loss of gas.
The amount of gas recovered would be the same whether it was
drawn from the naturally productive parcel or the adjacent,
heavily fracked parcel. If one could recover the same amount of
gas without contaminating millions of gallons of water, the use of
that water can only be described as wasteful.148
If the rights of landowners are to be protected fully, an
action in trespass for such an incursion would be imperative.
The landowner protected by such an action in a case like Coastal
Oil would be the owner of the productive parcel, who is entitled
to the profits from the resource trapped beneath his land. The
operator should not be permitted to deny those profits to the
landowner by using fracturing to free the gas and recover it on
the other side of a boundary. But if instead the chief objective is
the prevention of waste, allowing an action in trespass for
fracking over a boundary would be counter-intuitive. Imagine a
situation where a high producing well could easily recover a
greater amount of gas by extending its reach beyond a boundary
line through fracking. If this act were to be regarded as a
trespass, gas that would otherwise be recoverable would be lost,
creating waste.
In Coastal Oil, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the
rule of capture precluded any damages for drainage caused by
hydraulic fracturing.149 The Court’s reasoning depended largely
on two findings: first, that in order to recover gas from certain
geological formations “hydraulic fracturing is not optional”; and
second, that the practice “cannot be performed both to maximize
reasonable commercial effectiveness and to avoid all drainage.
Some drainage is virtually unavoidable.”150 The Texas Court
opted to hold in favor of the greater recovery of oil and gas, but
by relying on the rule of capture it recognized that it did so at the
expense of landowners whose assets were drained away.
148
The primary dictionary definition of “waste” is to “use or expend carelessly,
extravagantly, or to no purpose.” Waste, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1951
(3d ed. 2010).
149
Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 17.
150
Id. at 16.
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Even had the Court reached the opposite outcome, the issue
raised in Coastal Oil would still make clear that simultaneous
support for these two policy positions is not tenable. Given that
New York’s regulations allow for the drilling of infill wells within
330 feet of a spacing unit boundary151 and that hydraulic
fracturing wells can extend as far as 5,000 feet,152 situations
similar to those outlined in Coastal Oil are likely to arise. New
York’s legislature must provide guidance to the courts that will
have to decide these controversies as to which policy the State
favors. If the State wishes to protect the rights of landowners
regardless of potential waste, it should allow for a cause of action
in trespass for sub-surface fracturing. If, however, the State
prefers the policy of achieving a greater recovery of gas while
minimizing waste, sub-surface fracturing to achieve that
recovery should not constitute a trespass.
C.

Rights of the General Public

Finally, Article 23 provides for the full protection of the
rights of “all persons including . . . the general public.”153 As the
political entity in closest contact with any local community, the
municipality is the body in the best position to discern the will of
the public and defend local public interests. As such, the power
of local governments to determine what procedures may be
imposed on industry to safeguard local resources must be made
clear.
1.

Municipal Rights

The rights of the public as they might be embodied in local
municipalities are expressly limited by New York’s drilling
statute. Title 3 of Article 23 states that “[t]he provisions of this
article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the
regulation of the oil, gas[,] and solution mining industries,”154 but
does not provide an explicit definition of what it means by the
term “regulation,” particularly with regard to the term’s scope.
Nor does the statute completely foreclose local government
jurisdiction. It goes on to specify that its provisions do not
supersede “local government jurisdiction over local roads or the
151
152
153
154

PRDSGEIS,

supra note 26, ch. 5, at 22.
Id. ch. 5, at 25.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011).
Id. § 23-0303(2).
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rights of local governments under the real property tax law.”155
By allowing some local government jurisdiction to remain intact
and failing to define clearly which local actions are superseded,
the legislature has left the door open for localities to challenge
the limits on their remaining power. Recent experience in
Pennsylvania suggests that without more explicit statutory
guidance, this battle will be fought in the courts.
2.

Brethren in the Marcellus: The Rights of the General Public
in Pennsylvania

Due to the controversial nature of hydraulic fracturing, local
populations will most likely attempt to find a means of exerting
influence on local drilling activities above and beyond the
regulations imposed by State statute.
Across New York’s
southern border in Western Pennsylvania, the hydraulic
fracturing “gas rush” quickly created a flurry of action in
Pennsylvania courts as various municipalities sought to enact or
enforce local laws when drilling operations moved in. As in New
York, the governing statute in Pennsylvania purported to
supersede local jurisdiction over natural gas extraction. It read:
“No ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the
aforementioned acts shall contain provisions which impose
conditions, requirements[,] or limitations on the same features of
oil and gas well operations regulated by this act or that
accomplish the same purposes as set forth in this act.”156
But Pennsylvania’s attempt to supersede local jurisdiction on
questions of drilling regulation was not perceived by the courts
as absolute. In Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council,
Pennsylvania’s high court distinguished between provisions
imposing conditions on a well’s function and those addressing
only its location and found that municipalities were capable of
enacting the latter.157 If such a distinction were to apply in New
York, municipalities could potentially wield significant power
over natural gas regulation, redefining the spacing provisions
handed down by the State agency.
New York law, as it stands, does not provide a clear
indication of the direction courts will be likely to take. On the
one hand, there is Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, in which
155
156
157

Id.
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 (West 2011).
964 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 2009).
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a court shot down a local bond ordinance cloaked as a zoning
provision and levied against drillers.158 Conversely, there is the
more recent case of Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of
Sardinia,159 in which the court arrived at an outcome similar to
the function/location dichotomy of Huntley & Huntley.
In
Gernatt, which dealt with solid mineral extraction, not gas, the
Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether a municipality
may use its zoning authority to eliminate mining as a permitted
use in all of its districts.160 Title 27 of Article 23—the same
Article that governs gas extraction—contained a supersession
provision similar to that contained in Title 3.161 The court found
that general regulations of land use, like zoning ordinances, “are
not the type of regulatory provision the Legislature foresaw as
preempted . . . ; the distinction is between ordinances that
regulate property uses and ordinances that regulate mining
activities.”162 The court went on to say:
A municipality is not obliged to permit the exploitation of any
and all natural resources within the town as a permitted use if
limiting that use is a reasonable exercise of its police powers to
prevent damage to the rights of others and to promote the
interests of the community as a whole.163

Using this reasoning, courts could easily extrapolate that Title
3’s supersession provision, with its exception for enactments
under the real property tax law, is similar to the one at issue in
Gernatt and therefore “does not preempt the Town’s authority to
determine that mining should not be a permitted use of the land
within the Town.”164 Theoretically, then, a community that was
opposed to the practice of hydraulic fracturing could subvert the
DEC’s unitization and permitting process by closing off
productive land to drilling operations.
158
112 Misc. 2d 432, 435, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. 1982), aff’d,
89 A.D.2d 1056, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (4th Dep’t 1982).
159
87 N.Y.2d 668, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 642 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1996).
160
Id. at 681, 664 N.E.2d at 1234, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
161
Id. at 682, 664 N.E.2d at 1234–35, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 172–73; see also N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-2703(2)(b) (McKinney 2011) (“[T]his title shall supersede
all other state and local laws relating to the extractive mining industry; provided,
however, that nothing in this title shall be construed to prevent any local
government from . . . enacting or enforcing local zoning ordinances or laws which
determine permissible uses in zoning districts.”).
162
Gernatt, 87 N.Y.2d at 681–82, 664 N.E.2d at 1234, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
163
Id. at 684, 664 N.E.2d at 1235, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
164
Id. at 683, 664 N.E.2d at 1235, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
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A New York municipality might also attempt to circumvent
Article 23’s supersession clause by exploiting its exception for
jurisdiction over local roads. On this subject, a recent Texas case
is instructive. In Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean
Water v. Railroad Commission,165 the Court of Appeals found that
the state regulatory agency’s focus “only on the increased
recovery of oil and gas” was “too narrow a view of ‘the public
interest.’ ”166 The court required the agency to consider the
locality’s position on heavy truck traffic on small, rural roads as
being contrary to the public interest.167 The Texas Supreme
Court subsequently overruled.168 The court found that the
statute’s use of the term “public interest” was ambiguous,
entitling the agency’s construction of that term to deference.169
These discordant opinions highlight the ambiguity in New York’s
statute and the need for legislative clarification. If New York’s
regulatory agency or courts were to adopt a broad interpretation
of the rights of the general public referred to in Article 23, a
municipality could properly use its local road jurisdiction to
prohibit heavy truck traffic on the roads within a spacing unit.
This would effectively deprive the permit-holder of the supplies
necessary to conduct operations and prevent either drilling or
fracking to go forward.
Whether it is through a land-use prohibition or strict traffic
controls, municipal power might readily bring the protection of
the rights of the general public directly into opposition with the
policy aim of achieving a greater recovery of natural gas. Unless
the legislature addresses what, specifically, the scope of Article
23’s supersession clause covers and what power remains in the
hands of local governments, these questions will be wrestled with
in courts on a case by case basis. The time that thwarted
extractors will be forced to spend bogged down in litigation with
whole counties or individual townships is time they might
otherwise spend producing energy resources for the people of
New York.

165

254 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. 2007), rev’d, 336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 498.
167
Id. at 502.
168
R.R. Comm’n v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d
619 (Tex. 2011).
169
Id. at 628–29.
166
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III. RESOLUTION/PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
This Section offers a series of discrete solutions to the issues
raised in the analysis above.
A.

A More Inclusive Definition of “Waste”

First and foremost, in light of the unique situation of New
York’s shale beds in the midst of vital environmental resources,
the legislature should amend Article 23’s definition of waste to
include more than just the loss of potential gas production. If the
definition as it currently stands is meant to include more than
this limited understanding of waste, its language is not
sufficiently specific to make that clear.
The statutory definition of the term waste should be
amended to incorporate the broader understanding of the term
evidenced in the prdSGEIS.170 It should include environmental
waste and the waste products subject to regulatory disposal
standards. These include cuttings from drilling, pit liners, solid
residuals, and, most importantly, flowback or produced water.171
As written, Article 23 fails to address any type of environmental
waste. A complete balancing of the various policy aims of the
Article requires that environmental waste be considered in
addition to the actual loss of gas or the diminishment of potential
recovery.
The statute should be amended to reflect this
additional consideration.
B.

Correlative Rights & The Rights of Landowners

1.

Compulsory Integration

a.

Amendment of Article 23’s Policy Aims

The legislature should amend the policy provisions of Article
23 to more accurately reflect that in practice the rights of
landowners are subservient to the State’s interest in achieving a
greater recovery of gas.
The mechanism of compulsory
integration, where a landowner may decide only how her land
will be integrated, not whether it will be integrated, casts this
contradiction into sharp relief.172 A statute that allows for land

170
171
172

See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 130–34.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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to be compulsorily integrated but simultaneously claims to
protect the rights of landowners is at best disingenuous. The
clause containing the claim should either be removed or language
should be added to clarify that the landowners’ rights are
protected only to the extent that the landowner is entitled to
recover a proportional royalty of revenue derived from use of her
land under the correlative rights doctrine.
Alternatively, if the legislature wishes sincerely to preserve
the policy aim of protecting the rights of landowners, the practice
of compulsory integration must be done away with. Among the
rights that landowners possess in their land is the right to keep
that land free from industrial drilling.173 If the State wishes to
preserve that right, it cannot compel owners to allow drilling on
or under their land, regardless of the interest of the State in
greater recovery.
b.

The Rights of Operators on Integrated Land

If the practice of compulsory integration is to continue, the
legislature must specify what rights operators have over
integrated land. Under the terms of the statute at present,
operators could conceivably conduct more than subsurface
intrusions on an integrated property. The statute does not
explicitly prohibit an integrated property being subjected to
surface disturbances.
As such, an unwilling landowner’s
property might be used for storage of produced water, storage in
open pits of cuttings contaminated with chemical additives, truck
access, parking, or even actual drilling. A court finding that the
statute allows such activities could deny the landowner any
recourse.174
As of this writing, no incidents of surface disturbance of
integrated land have been recorded. Once the moratorium on
hydraulic fracturing in the state is lifted, however, and drilling
activities increase, private sector operators will be looking to
173

See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (characterizing the right to exclude as the “hallmark of a
protected property interest”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 3–4, 8 (1990); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information
Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (“American
courts and commentators have deemed the ‘right to exclude’ foremost among the
property rights, with . . . leading property scholars describing the right as the core,
or the essential element, of ownership.”).
174
See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
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maximize their profits. Rather than wait for a transgression—or
a series of transgressions—to reveal the extent of the gap in the
statutory language, the legislature should address the question
of what rights permit-holders have over integrated land before
the moratorium on fracking is lifted.
2.

Subsurface Fracturing and the Issue of Trespass

To save the issue of whether subsurface fracturing
constitutes a trespass from a long and arduous period of
litigation, the legislature must specify which policy aim it values
more highly: landowners’ rights or the prevention of waste in
achieving the greater recovery of gas.
If the legislature
addresses that question, resolving the trespass issue is simple. If
landowners’ rights are to be paramount, any subsurface
incursion by fracking should be considered a trespass and the
owner should be entitled to recover for the gas extracted from his
land by fracking. If, however, the greater recovery of gas is to
prevail, subsurface incursion by fracking should not constitute a
trespass so long as it is done to minimize waste.175 Given the
high environmental impact of the practice, the New York
legislature should adopt the latter approach.
C.

Rights of the General Public: A Clear Standard of Local
Authority

Finally, the legislature should amend Article 23 to provide
local governments with a clear, definitive standard of the
jurisdiction they retain under the Article’s supersession clause.
The legislature could avoid much confusion and a great deal of
litigation simply by defining the term “regulation” in that clause,
clearly delineating what powers remain available to local
authorities. In light of the outcomes of Huntley & Huntley in
Pennsylvania’s high court and Garnatt in New York’s, lawmakers
should anticipate that many municipalities will likely attempt to
regulate the location of drilling activities and the traffic to and
from drilling sites. In some communities, these regulations may
be so strict as to amount to a prohibition on fracking. If it is the
legislature’s intention to grant local governments that power, an
amendment clarifying that intention will be helpful for both local
governments and the courts who are certain to hear the
175

See supra Part II.B.3.b.
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industry’s inevitable challenges to such restrictions.
If
lawmakers do not wish for municipalities to have that power, an
amendment stating as much will deter improper attempts at
local regulation and prevent the majority of those challenges.
CONCLUSION
New York’s system of regulating the process of hydraulic
fracturing under the Mineral Resources Law is both thorough
and comprehensive. The system’s flaw lies in attempting to
achieve policy goals that bear inherent contradictions. Because
of the highly controversial nature of the subject, regulation of
hydraulic fracturing will continue to receive a great deal of
attention as the moratorium on the practice is lifted. With
modest effort, New York’s legislature can correct a number of the
law’s internal contradictions and anticipate issues that are likely
to arise. The discrete amendments to Article 23 suggested above
will save an untold amount of time and resources otherwise
certain to be expended by administrative agencies, courts, and
the private sector. Given the State’s interests in developing its
gas fields and preserving its environmental resources, New
York’s legislature should not hesitate to act.

